Biometrics and the United Kingdom National Identity Register: Exploring the privacy dilemmas of proportionality and secondary use of biometric information by Martin, Aaron K.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
CONF-IRM 2008 Proceedings International Conference on Information ResourcesManagement (CONF-IRM)
5-2008
Biometrics and the United Kingdom National
Identity Register: Exploring the privacy dilemmas
of proportionality and secondary use of biometric
information
Aaron K. Martin
The London School of Economics and Political Science, a.k.martin@lse.ac.uk
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/confirm2008
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Resources Management (CONF-IRM) at AIS Electronic Library
(AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in CONF-IRM 2008 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For
more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Martin, Aaron K., "Biometrics and the United Kingdom National Identity Register: Exploring the privacy dilemmas of proportionality
and secondary use of biometric information" (2008). CONF-IRM 2008 Proceedings. 13.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/confirm2008/13
18F. Biometrics and the United Kingdom National 
Identity Register: Exploring the privacy dilemmas of 
proportionality and secondary use of biometric 
information 
 
Aaron K. Martin 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
a.k.martin@lse.ac.uk 
 
Abstract  
Despite the obvious importance of privacy concerns in the information age, “privacy” 
remains a messy concept in the academic literature. Scholars are thus attempting to clarify 
and systematize the privacy concept. They have proposed two important dimensions of 
privacy concerns: 1) proportionality, or the adequate, relevant and non-excessive collection 
of personal data, and 2) secondary usage, or the prohibition of subsequent, unspecified uses 
of personal information. 
 
This paper takes measure of the proportionality and potential secondary uses of biometric 
data in the proposed United Kingdom (UK) National Identity Register (NIR). It argues that 
the UK Identity Cards Act 2006 fails to guard against violations of the principles of 
proportionality and secondary usage of biometric data.  
 
After reviewing the modern literature on informational privacy protection, I analyze 
biometrics and their privacy implications. I then discuss these implications in the context of 
the UK government’s NIR plans. The analysis yields insights into how biometrics on the 
proposed NIR interplay with purpose specifications, architectural concerns, knowledge 
asymmetries and public anxieties. I also explore potential secondary uses of the types of 
biometric data that could be stored in the NIR. Last, a brief note is offered about the possible 
means of regulating against privacy infringements. 
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1. Introduction  
Around the world, organizations of varying size and purpose are moving towards increased 
identification standards. National governments are amongst these organizations, as they grow 
ever more concerned with collecting and sharing information about the identities of citizens 
and foreign visitors. 
 
On 30 March 2006, the UK Parliament passed legislation enabling a National Identity 
Scheme (NIS), with a key component being a national database of personal information 
called the National Identity Register (NIR). The purposes of the scheme as put forth in the 
UK Identity Cards Act 2006 include the facilitation of information about individuals in the 
UK to those reasonably requiring proof. Importantly, such facilitation must only occur when 
in the “public interest”. In the Act, “public interest” encompasses: 1) national security; 2) the 
prevention or detection of crime; 3) immigration control; 4) the enforcement of prohibitions 
on unauthorized working or employment; and 5) securing the efficient and effective provision 
of public services. 
 
In this paper I argue that, despite the UK government’s seemingly good intentions, the 
current proposals do little to address concerns about proportionality and abuse of recorded 
information. I also argue that, in practice, the broad notion of “public interest” might increase 
the likelihood of privacy infringements by providing a catchall justification for data 
collection and use. The UK government’s plans are further compromised by its poor 
performance record in terms of safeguarding citizens’ personal data, especially in light of 
recent security breaches at Her Majesty’s Customs and Revenue (HMRC), the UK tax 
agency. The collection, storage, processing and subsequent use of biometric information on 
the UK NIR introduces unresolved privacy dilemmas, particularly with respect to the 
principles of proportionality and aspects of secondary usage of data. These issues must be 
considered, deliberated and protected against prior to the widespread collection and storage 
of biometric information.  
 
2. Conceptualizing privacy 
There is a rich, diverse, and multidisciplinary body of literature on privacy. This literature 
includes contributions from law, regulation, sociology, psychology, and, increasingly, from 
management and technology. Yet, numerous authors have noted the difficulty of 
conceptualizing and defining privacy; its slipperiness and vagueness often results in 
misunderstandings about alleged violations. Recognizing this, Daniel Solove has formulated 
what he calls a taxonomy of privacy in order to “shift focus away from the vague term of 
‘privacy’ and toward specific activities that pose privacy problems” (2006, pp. 481-482). 
Although Solove’s analysis is placed in the US context, I suggest that his framework can be 
usefully extended to privacy concerns in the context of the UK NIS. While the current 
analysis is specifically concerned with the principle of proportionality and problems of 
secondary usage of data, I briefly outline Solove’s taxonomy so as to better understand its 
implications in the larger privacy arena. 
 
Echoing Davies (1998, p. 93), Solove aptly notes that modern day privacy problems are 
generally architectural in nature. These architectural risks “involve less the overt insult or 
reputation harm to a person and more the creation of risk that a person might be harmed in 
the future” (2006, p. 487). Two types of architectural risks frequently emerge: 1) the 
enhancement of risk of future harm and 2) imbalances of social and institutional power. In 
Solove’s taxonomy, there are four main categories of harmful activities under which different 
subcategories fall. These include: 1) information collection, 2) information processing, 3) 
information dissemination and 4) invasion (p. 488). I discuss each in turn.  
 
2.1 Information Collection 
Solove identifies two information collection activities: surveillance and interrogation. The 
former becomes problematic when done in a certain manner, say continuously or 
surreptitiously (2006, p. 493). Surveillance is a tool of social control because it tends to result 
in self-censorship and inhibition. Performed covertly, it is worrisome because it may have so-
called chilling effects, whereby speech or conduct is suppressed or restricted out of fear of 
penalties. However, eliminating secrecy from surveillance does not necessarily make it 
desirable or acceptable. As Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon demonstrates, even an awareness 
of the possibility of surveillance can inhibit behavior (Solove, 2006, p. 495). 
 
Moreover, Solove observes that, while the law often addresses surveillance, it does so quite 
narrowly and under what he coins the “secrecy paradigm”: 
 
Under the secrecy paradigm, privacy is tantamount to complete secrecy, and a privacy 
violation occurs when concealed data is revealed to others. If the information is not previously 
hidden, then no privacy interest is implicated by the collection or dissemination of the 
information. In many areas of law, this narrow view of privacy has limited the recognition of 
privacy violations (2006, p. 497). 
 
Surveillance is thus potentially harmful in all settings, not just private ones, as public 
surveillance can cause uneasiness and distrust. 
 
The second form of data collection, interrogation, involves pressuring individuals to disclose 
concealed information, often creating discomfort and distortion (pp. 500-501). 
 
2.2 Information Processing 
The information processing dimension of privacy involves the ways collected information is 
stored, manipulated and used. Solove’s taxonomy divides information processing concerns 
into the following subcategories: aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use and 
exclusion (2006, p. 505). 
 
Data aggregation is the gathering together of bits of information that by themselves are not 
very telling. When combined, these data begin to form a more detailed profile of an 
individual. New information technologies have made data aggregation easier and cheaper, 
leading to novel architectural problems (p. 507). 
 
Following Roger Clarke (1998), Solove defines identification as “the association of data with 
a particular human being” (2006, p. 510). It entails a link to a person in the flesh and attaches 
informational baggage to people (pp. 510-511). Moreover, identification creates architectural 
problems insofar as it increases government control over people (p. 513). 
 
Insecurity is a problem caused by the mishandling and poor protection of personal 
information, often resulting in identity theft. Solove remarks that despite the law’s reluctance 
to find harm simply from the insecure storage of information, insecurity does indeed result in 
one being placed in a weakened state and made more vulnerable (p. 518). 
 
Secondary use is “the use of data for purposes unrelated to the purposes for which the data 
was initially collected without the data subject’s consent” (p. 519). Proportionality and 
secondary usage are tightly intertwined concepts. Various privacy principles and laws 
acknowledge secondary usage as a serious problem by prohibiting it through what are known 
as purpose specification principles (pp. 519-520). For example, Article 6 of the EU 
‘Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data’ (Directive 95/46/EC), specifies that member states shall 
ensure that all personal data are: 
• “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a 
way incompatible with those purposes; 
• adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected and/or further processed; 
• kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further 
processed” (EU Directive, 1995). 
 
Closely related to the problem of secondary usage is what Paul Schwartz calls the asymmetry 
of knowledge problem (1999, p. 1683). About this Solove notes: 
 
…even with privacy policies stating that information might be used in secondary ways, people 
often do not read or understand these policies. Nor can they appropriately make an informed 
decision about secondary uses since they might have little idea about the range of potential 
uses (2006, p. 520, emphasis added). 
 
Solove notes two further problems with secondary use. The first is that it generates fear and 
uncertainty concerning future uses of collected data, thus instilling a sense of powerlessness 
and vulnerability among data subjects. In addition, secondary data usage can create 
architectural problems related to risk of future harm in that information may not fit well with 
new uses. Once these data are decontextualized, the potential for misunderstandings increases 
(p. 520). 
 
Finally, exclusion is failing to provide data subjects with information and input about their 
records (p. 521). It too creates an architectural problem as it reduces organizational 
accountability to those data subjects with records on file. 
 
2.3 Information Dissemination 
This category of privacy harms encompasses revelations of personal data as well as threats to 
do so. Solove understands information dissemination as including such acts as breach of 
confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail, appropriation, and 
distortion. I review each briefly. 
 
Solove defines breach of confidentiality as revealing secrets about someone in a way that 
violates trust in the relationship (2006, p. 524). Related to this is the third party doctrine, by 
which information possessed or known by third parties is not subject to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. This third party doctrine is based on the secrecy paradigm and 
especially relevant in the information age.  
 
Disclosure occurs when “certain true information about a person is revealed to others” 
(p.529). When revealed publicly, such information may be used in unforeseeable ways, thus 
paralleling the problems of secondary usage. Exposure resembles disclosure in that both 
involve the release of true information. Yet, whereas disclosure entails the release of 
information with which others may judge the data subject’s character, the information 
involved in exposure lacks such significance. According to Solove, “exposure creates injury 
because we have developed social practices to conceal aspects of life that we find animal-like 
or disgusting” (p. 534). 
 
The privacy harm associated with increased accessibility is indirect in nature. It is an 
enhancement of risk of disclosure and the problems thereof. With increased accessibility 
comes the potential for using data in ways neither originally conceived of nor originally 
intended (p. 537). For Solove, blackmail is harmful because it permits the control of the data 
subject by means of threat and distortions in relational power (p. 540).  
Appropriation is “the use of one’s identity or personality for the purposes and goals of 
another” and takes on two dimensions; the first is related to dignity and the second to 
property rights. Solove recognizes that most contemporary claims of misappropriation are 
argued in terms of property rather than dignity, noting, “Loss of property seems to be more 
readily recognized by courts today than the more amorphous feelings of embarrassment or 
loss of dignity” (p. 544). Last, distortion involves inaccurately portraying a data subject and 
covers such phenomena as false light, defamation and record system inaccuracies (p. 546). 
 
2.4 Invasion 
The final category of privacy harms includes two types: intrusion and decisional interference. 
Intrusions are “invasions or incursions into one’s life” and include such things as spam and 
telemarketing (pp. 549-550), while decisional interference is government interference in 
decisions related to a data’s subject life (p. 554). Solove argues that decisional interference 
resembles secondary usage in that both can have chilling effects on a data subject’s 
relationship with her/his body. This point is especially relevant to an analysis of biometrics. 
 
 
3. Basic biometric concepts 
Having reviewed Solove’s taxonomy of privacy, here I present the basic concepts of 
biometrics before moving onto the particulars of the case.1 
 
Biometrics consist of physiological or behavioral measurements. The former include facial 
geometry, fingerprinting, hand geometry, vein pattering, iris patterning and DNA profiling, 
among others. The latter involve such characteristics as signatures, keystroke dynamics, gait 
and speech or voice2, and are occasionally referred to as behaviometrics (Nisenson, Yariv, El-
Yaniv, & Meir, 2003, pp. 363-364). Unlike conventional methods of identification that rely 
on what you know (passwords, cryptographic keys) or what you possess (tokens, cards), 
biometrics depend on the human body itself: on what you are and what you do (Zviran & 
Erlich 2006). 
 
It is generally agreed that, to qualify as a biometric, a bodily measurement must satisfy 
certain requirements. According to Jain, Ross and Prabhakar (2004), bodily features should 
be: 1) universal, 2) distinct, 3) relatively permanent and 4) collectable. Universality means 
that all participants in a scheme possess the characteristic. If this is not the case, then 
compulsory participation would prove difficult to enforce. Alternatively, multiple biometrics 
might be employed in the case of non-universality, as was originally proposed in the UK 
upon realization that not everyone in the UK may have readable fingerprints, for example. 
The distinctiveness requirement aims to prevent situations in which different people share the 
same characteristic. For example, using height (a common bodily measurement) as a 
biometric identifier would be very challenging in this respect. Permanence is important in 
that a rapidly changing identifier would result in live biometrics not matching their stored 
counterparts, thus undermining the system wholesale. The quantitative measurability of a 
biometric determines its collectability (Jain et al., 2004, p.4).  
 
There are certain steps that must be taken before a biometric scheme can be said to be 
operational. These include the initial capture of biometric data across a population, the 
subsequent processing or conditioning of these data for storage purposes, feature extraction 
                                                 
1 This section intentionally excludes a discussion of the various technical shortcomings associated with 
biometric systems as the effectiveness of the technologies involved is not under investigation in this paper. For a 
thorough review of the known limitations, errors and failures inherent to biometric systems, see O’Gorman 
(2003). 
2 Usually characterized as a behavioral biometric, voice does have an underlying physiological component 
(O'Gorman, 2003). 
and template generation. Note that while actual raw biometric images may be saved for 
administrative reasons (Clarke, 2001), most often compressed, feature-extracted templates are 
stored and compared against live data captures. 
 
3.1 Images versus templates 
There is a general understanding that, for biometric systems, featured-extracted templates of 
biometric images that are stored in databases instead of the images themselves. For example, 
certain system implementations collect information about the fingerprint or measurements of 
the face rather than collecting a complete image of the finger or face. However, this is not 
universally true. For instance, forensic applications do store original images (Faundez-Zanuy, 
2005, p. 14). Also, for systems of such grand scale and complexity as a national identification 
scheme, it may be necessary to record and file original images in the event that a decision is 
made to implement another vendor’s proprietary technology (including algorithms, templates, 
scanners, middleware and databases). The current lack of biometric standards means that new 
templates would have to be reprocessed from original images. Presumably, re-recording an 
entire national population’s biometrics in person would prove an administrative nightmare, 
hence the perceived need to store these original images. 
 
3.2 Multimodal biometric systems 
It is also widely believed that the use of multiple (multimodal) biometrics for recognition is 
more reliable than systems that rely on a single (unimodal) biometric trait (Jain & Ross, 
2004; Lazarick, 2005). Supposedly, multiple, distinct pieces of biometric information may be 
combined to address certain problems that plague biometric systems, namely hacking 
(Faundez-Zanuy, 2004), spoofing (Matsumoto, Matsumoto, Yamada, & Hoshino, 2002) and 
the non-universality of particular biometric features in the population (Jain & Ross, 2004, pp. 
37-38). For example, someone without hands, thus incapable of providing fingerprints, might 
present her/his irises to a biometric reader instead. Multimodal systems have even been 
described as a positive for privacy. Faundez-Zanuy argues that certain privacy concerns may 
be resolved by “using a multimodal biometric system, where the user can freely decide 
between several biometric identifiers, and reject the system that he considers may reveal 
private information” (2005, p. 15). 
 
4. The case of the UK NIR 
As mentioned, the proposed UK NIR is just one component of a larger scheme. According to 
the Strategic Action Plan published by the UK Home Office (2006, p. 7), the interior ministry 
responsible for the scheme, other principal elements include such documents as identity (ID) 
cards and passports, as well as such procedural elements as applications, identity checks and 
background checks. While the ID card and passport are the most highly publicized 
components of the scheme and are often the focus of heavy media coverage (Martin and 
Whitley 2007), it is the databases which comprise the NIR that are of primary concern in this 
analysis. According to the Act, over 50 types of personal information may be stored on the 
register for each individual. 
   
In its original conception, the NIR was to be a single, massive database, created anew, in 
which all information would be stored together for each individual (Identity Cards Act, 
2006). However, this changed in December 2006 when the department responsible for 
administering the scheme, the UK Identity and Passport Service, housed within the Home 
Office, released its Strategic Action Plan to set out a revised database schema for the register 
(UKIPS, 2006). At present, a set of different databases is envisioned on which biometric, 
biographical and administrative information are to be separated.3 The stated reasons for this 
segregation include increased security and making use of “the strengths of existing systems” 
(UKIPS, 2006, p. 10). However, it is still unclear whether this separation of data is to occur 
logically or physically. 
 
4.1 Biometrics and the NIR  
Clarifications were also made in the Strategic Action Plan regarding the use of biometrics in 
the identity scheme. Four biometric features were explicitly mentioned in the original Act: 
fingerprints, facial photographs, iris patterns and signatures4 (2006). In fact, the Act defined 
‘biometric information’, as “data about [an individual’s] external characteristics, including, in 
particular, the features of an iris or of any other part of the eye”. However, the December 
2006 Strategic Action Plan downplayed the role of irises, noting that: 
 
When you enrol into the Scheme, your fingerprint biometrics (all 10 fingerprints) will be 
recorded and stored in the National Identity Register. A subset of these will be held on your 
ID card or passport, in line with International Civil Aviation Organization standards. The 
introduction of iris biometrics also remains an option (UKIPS, 2006, p. 16, emphasis 
added). 
 
Notably, the latest government report on the ID cards scheme, The National Identity Scheme 
Delivery Plan 2008, released in March, makes no mention of irises. 
 
It appears the decision to drop or postpone the introduction of iris biometrics in the NIR 
results from concerns about costs (because iris scanning technology is significantly more 
expensive than, say, fingerprinting) and international obligations (because there is no 
international consensus on iris scanning), although some have speculated that the poor 
performance of current technology is to blame (Espiner, 2007). However, it should be noted 
that the minimal formal International Civil Aviation Organization requirement is a digital 
facial photograph. States are given the option to supplement this with fingerprint or iris 
images but by no means is this obligatory. 
 
 
5. Privacy analysis of the NIR 
Here I focus on what is known and unknown about the NIR at present in assessing it in terms 
of its proportionality and potential secondary usages. 
 
5.1 Proportionality 
5.1.1 Unclear purpose 
As Zorkadis and Donos state, “respecting the principle of purpose implies an understanding 
of, first, a clear definition of the purpose for which the biometric data is collected and 
processed” (2004, p. 131). One may argue that the purpose(s) for which biometric data are to 
be collected for storage on the NIR are not clearly defined. The umbrella of “public interest” 
lacks the clear specification required by principles of proportionality. Moreover, the all-
                                                 
3 According to the Strategic Action Plan, the systems to be reused are biometric systems used for asylum 
seekers and biometric visas, the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) Customer Information System (CIS) 
technology and existing Identity and Passport Service (IPS) systems (2006, p. 10-11). 
4 While signature analysis is considered a reliable behavioral biometric method, traditional, static signatures are 
not. It is still uncertain which of these is to be included in the NIR, although it is most likely the case that only 
static images of signatures will be stored. Jones, Antón, & Earp (2007) note that the distinction between 
traditional signatures and signature analysis as a biometric method is a point of confusion for many users. 
encompassing reasons enumerated in the Act (2006), namely national security, crime 
prevention and detection, immigration control, restricting unauthorized work and improved 
provision of public services, are so broad as to be uninformative if not dangerous. For 
instance, in the contemporary political climate in which a growing number of deviant 
activities are deemed contrary to national security interests, one must consider potential 
scenarios in which biometric information might be abused by public authorities, say at 
political gatherings and public protests. 
 
Controversy regarding government databases and proportionality is not without precedent. As 
publicized by the watchdog organization Genewatch (2006), the UK national DNA database 
(UK NDNAD) has witnessed its share of disproportionate uses. To quote the report at length: 
 
Research using the Database is supposed to be restricted to the purpose of detecting or 
reducing crime. However, this has been interpreted broadly by the Board to include research 
on predicting characteristics such as ethnicity from DNA. There is nothing to prevent future 
research without consent using either the Database or samples, potentially including 
controversial topics such as searching for 'genes for criminality'. 
 
This loose interpretation of purpose in the UK NDNAD foreshadows a potentially wide array 
of misuses and abuses of biometric data stored on the NIR. Recently, there has even been 
speculation by former Home Secretary Charles Clarke about linking the UK NDNAD and 
NIR (Buchanan, 2007). Whether this is to happen is difficult to predict, but the prospect 
speaks to the gruesome potential for disproportionate use of the NIR. 
 
5.1.2 Architectural problems 
Certain things must also be noted about architectural problems of the NIR based on 
information available in the December 2006 Strategic Action Plan. At issue is the first type of 
architectural problem identified by Solove: the enhancement of risk of future harm. The 
centralization of a massive amount of biometric data, even if separated from bibliographical 
and administrative data as mentioned in the strategic action plan, lends itself to abuse by 
officials. Pooling together the biometric data of the entire UK population significantly 
increases the risk of a breach. The recent loss of data on all UK families by HMRC provides 
a cautionary tale. 
 
5.1.3 Asymmetry of knowledge 
Also of concern is the general lack of specificity by the government concerning the ways 
biometrics are to be collected, stored and processed by the various systems. For one, it 
remains unclear whether original images are to be recorded and filed somewhere for 
administrative purposes. Moreover, there has been no public discussion regarding the need 
for multimodal biometrics as well as whether and how they are to be fused (Jain & Ross 
2004, pp. 38-40). For example, are scanned biometrics to be recorded locally on readers 
during the verification process? If so, then there might be additional privacy risks on local 
machines – as was recently discovered in photocopiers in which all copied and scanned 
images were stored on disk drives, unbeknownst to users (CNN, 2007). Unfortunately, very 
little information about such system components has been publicized, and thus asymmetries 
of knowledge persist. To make matters even more confusing, the government recently 
announced in its March 2008 Delivery Plan that it seeks to create a “market” for biometrics 
enrollment rather than handling biometrics enrollment itself. This focus on reducing costs 
introduces huge data protections concerns and engenders further knowledge asymmetries 
regarding the collection, storage and processing of biometric data. 
 
Furthermore, the aforementioned likelihood of dropping iris information from the NIR 
jeopardizes the entire case for a multimodal system. However, the UK government remains 
silent on this point. If we take Faundez-Zanuy’s point for granted, that multiple biometrics 
are a good thing for privacy because users may choose which biometric to employ, thus 
keeping secret the biometric of their choice, then the exclusion of irises may be understood as 
harming privacy (or at least perceptions thereof). 
 
5.1.4 Fear and uncertainty 
According to Solove, two further harms related to proportionality are fear and uncertainty. 
There exists good reason for fear and uncertainty amongst the UK public concerning 
potential harms caused by the storage and use of biometric information by authorities. In 
particular, the case of Shirley McKie does very little to quell these misgivings. McKie, a 
police officer in Scotland, faced a decade of legal troubles and financial hardship due to a 
botched crime scene fingerprint analysis. Her thumbprint was supposedly recovered at a 
murder scene despite her adamancy about having never been present at the crime scene. The 
handling of her case by fellow police officers and politicians did much harm to public 
perceptions of fingerprinting, especially with respect to the involvement of officials in the 
process (see HMIC (2000) for more information). The introduction of biometrics into a day-
to-day nationwide identity scheme might encounter similar, if not worse problems. 
 
5.2 Secondary usage of biometric data 
While very little is known about the technical specifications of the biometric systems to be 
used in the NIR outside of the kinds of biometrics that might be employed, it is still possible 
to speculate about potential secondary uses of the biometric data intended for the register. 
 
5.2.1 Known and possible uses of biometric data 
In addition to forensic uses of information such as fingerprints, there are other known and 
possible uses of biometric data that deserve attention. 
• High resolution photographs of the eye have been shown to indicate whether a patient 
suffers from diabetes, arteriosclerosis or hypertension, among other ailments (Faundez-
Zanuy, 2005, p. 13). Depending on the use of templates in the NIR, or whether original 
images are saved in some system for administrative purposes, this sort of information 
may be obtainable by those with access to certain parts of the register, such as civil 
servants. If this information were accessed by insurance companies, then data subjects 
might face additional difficulties in insuring themselves. 
• Bowyer, Hollingsworth and Flynn (2008) point to recent research with the objective of 
predicting ethnicity based on a person’s iris image (Qiu, Sun, & Tan, 2006). Moreover, 
others have demonstrated the ability to predict gender by analyzing irises (Thomas, 
Chawla, Bowyer, & Flynn, 2007). They conclude that “these works point out a possible 
privacy issue arising with iris biometrics, in that information might be obtained about a 
person other than simply whether their identity claim is true or false” (Bowyer et al., 
2008, pp. 27-28). 
• Faundez-Zanuy cites studies which suggest that fingerprints and finger images might 
disclose such medical information as whether a person is affected by Downs syndrome, 
Turner syndrome, Klinefelter syndrome, intestinal obstruction, leukemia, breast cancer 
and Rubella syndrome. He also cites a study linking fingerprints and homosexuality 
(2005, pp. 14-15).5 
                                                 
5 Even if the science behind these claims is not credible, the fact that it is being undertaken speaks to potential 
secondary usage of data issues. 
• One possible secondary use of facial images is in compiling mug shots for witnesses of 
crimes. It is not certain whether such usages fall under the purposes of the scheme and 
register, namely crime prevention and detection. Arguably, there are serious ethical and 
privacy concerns at issue in this use of facial images. 
• Last, access to large stores of signatures might prove handy to those engaged in credit 
card or check fraud. It is hoped that technical protections such as encryption would be 
used to protect signature data, but at present details are unclear. 
 
 
5.3 Possible modes of regulation 
The question of how to prevent the abovementioned privacy violations is a difficult one. With 
the UK NDNAD in mind, it seems that largely legal means of regulation are ineffective in 
practice, especially considering the presumed complexity of the systems involved in the NIR. 
One might also argue that it is possible to regulate privacy through the technology itself 
(Lessig, 1999); however, regulation by means of code alone might prove insufficient. 
According to Solove, “privacy problems… are caused not by technology alone, but primarily 
through activities of people, businesses, and the government. The way to address privacy 
problems is to regulate these activities” (2006, p. 560). With that in mind, it appears an 
appropriate course of action is through improved laws protecting biometric privacy, 
combined with certain technologies such as encryption or, perhaps, cancelable biometrics 
(Bolle, Connell, & Ratha, 2002). Additionally organizational practices and activities should 
be geared towards optimizing privacy protections. 
 
Very recently, a government-commissioned report on identity assurance prepared by Sir 
James Crosby included in its ten broad principles for consumer-driven universal ID assurance 
the following recommendation, which speaks to the arguments of this paper: “As a matter of 
principle, the amount of data stored should be minimised. Full biometric images (other 
than photographs) should not be kept. Only non-unique digital representations of 
biometric images should be stored. Additional data accessed during enrolment and records 
of verification enquiries should not be retained. All data and systems should be protected by 
‘state of the art’ encryption technology” (Crosby, 2008, p. 7, emphasis added). 
 
Time will tell whether those in charge of the NIR and its development take heed of this 
recommendation. In any case, it should be reiterated that regulating something like privacy in 
such multifold ways is tremendously difficult, which calls into question the advisability of 
mass government collection of biometrics. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To be fair, the Home Office and Identity and Passport Service have taken some small strides 
to address arguments like those outlined above. The National Identity Scheme Delivery Plan 
states, “We will consult with the Information Commissioner on the information we will hold 
on the NIR. Our aim is to have the minimum information on the NIR needed to identify an 
individual and to meet the statutory purposes under the Identity Cards Act 2006” (UKIPS, 
2008, p. 13). This appears an attempt to address issues of proportionality and, perhaps 
indirectly, secondary use. Unfortunately, history shows that regulatory bodies like the 
Information Commissioner’s Office have limited powers to make good on extensive policy 
protections. 
 
This paper has deliberated on the ways privacy concerns related to proportionality and 
secondary uses of data are implicated by the proposed UK NIR. There are, however, 
numerous other components of privacy that also deserve a focused analysis. Scope limitations 
have prevented such analyses in this undertaking and further research is necessary. For 
example, as concerns highly sensitive biometric information stored on the register, there is 
the potential for blackmail by those with insider access. If such information were to reveal a 
serious medical condition, the disclosure of which proving devastating to the data subject, 
then there is a case to be made that there is real harm to be done. Blackmail is just one such 
privacy area that remains to be explored. 
 
Beyond the privacy debate, however, there are numerous other issues related to the public 
perceptions of and confidence in government systems that demand further academic scrutiny, 
not just in the UK but all over the globe. With biometrics being incorporated into various 
identity systems internationally, be they at airports, land border crossings or as part of local 
entitlement schemes, for example, the public are increasingly encountering systems involving 
high degrees of technological complexity and innovation. Researchers need to begin asking 
questions about the ways in which the public interpret and make sense of such innovative 
systems. Arguably, public reactions to, understandings of and trust in such biometric 
innovations will largely determine their uptake and success. 
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